Showing posts with label free will. Show all posts
Showing posts with label free will. Show all posts

Friday, December 13, 2024

Two thoughts on activism

How persecution affects consciousness

"Any temptation I had at age twenty-three to categorize oppressed people in binaries, as either heroic resisters or unjust victims, was ended." Wonderful to see this new piece from Natalie Zemon Davis, with forward by Stefan Hanß #OpenAccess #EarlyModern 🗃️ www.cambridge.org/core/journal...

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— Brodie Waddell (@brodiewaddell.bsky.social) September 23, 2024 at 3:37 AM

Quote: "I was without a passport and not part of a university community for years. This article reflects on the impact of this experience of persecution on my work as a historian, and the relationship between politics, activism, and what Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre called ‘the historian’s craft’ and ‘consciousness’."

Experiencing Exclusion: Scholarship after Inquisition Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 September 2024. Natalie Zemon Davis and Stefan Hanß.

People feel that standing up for a cause makes them 'happy'

You shouldn't take action because it will make you feel good; you should do it because it's the right thing to do.

I believe the concept of "happiness" in this discourse functions to say that people are intrinsically motivated to do what we feel is right, and that this intrinsic motivation delivers a long-term "reward" in terms of brain chemistry.

From a 15-year-old article by Drake Bennett:

At least if recent research is to be believed, political activism, no matter the cause, seems to make people happy - even if they don’t win an election or triumph in a ballot initiative. Psychologists curious about what fuels human happiness have looked at political engagement and political activism, and they’ve found that it provides people with a sense of empowerment, of community, of freedom, and of transcendence.

* * *

It’s not just a life of self-denying dedication to a larger cause but a pursuit with immediate and enduring psychic rewards.

* * *

They gave their subjects, again college students, a survey about the food in the dining hall. Some were given questions that primed them to think about what Kasser and Klar call the “ethical-political aspects” of the food: For example, they read a statement asserting that the cafeteria should offer fair trade products, then were asked to rate the importance of two different rationales offered for that decision. Another group was given suggestions that focused on apolitical aspects like the variety and the taste of the food. Both groups were then asked to write a note to the cafeteria director about the aspect of the food that was most important to them. ... “What we found,” says [Tim] Kasser, “was that the activist felt significantly more vital and alive and energized than did the nonactivist group.”

* * *

Other studies, including one in 2001 by the psychologists Holly Hart, Dan McAdams, Barton Hirsch, and Jack Bauer, found that activism was strongly correlated with a quality called generativity, a sense of responsibility for others. And generativity, several studies have found, is in turn correlated with happiness.

* * *

The power of political activism, says Kasser, is that it manages to provide so many of the requirements for human happiness. It gives people a sense of efficacy and a conviction that they are changing their world. It provides an often rich social network. Because political causes are freely chosen, activism enhances a person’s sense of their own independence. And it gives a sense of self-transcendence, of being a part of something larger than your own individual concerns. All of these things, Kasser says, have been shown to make us happier.

Other researchers question whether there’s anything special about activism’s ability to make us happy. Tom Sander, the director of the Saguaro Seminar, a Harvard initiative studying levels of trust and civic engagement in American society, points to Saguaro research on religious belief, another reliable predictor of happiness. What’s interesting about religion, he points out, is that the actual believing part doesn’t seem to account for the greater happiness. What does account for it is the deeply social nature of churches and synagogues and mosques.

“It’s not how often they pray or belief about the afterlife or any content from the pulpit,” he says. The best predictor of happiness is “the number of friends they have at church.”

"The upside of 'down with.'" Drake Bennett. The Boston Globe: Ideas. October 11, 2009.

Andrea Pitzer: 'We need to dig dirt and plant seeds'

Knowing things doesn't rise to the level of witnessing, let alone does it change anything.

"...one third of the electorate has entirely checked out. Meanwhile, one third is supporting someone using all the language of authoritarianism and abuse. The last third is following what’s happening but sometimes mistaking knowledge for action.

Knowledge is necessary, but knowledge is not the same thing as action. And spectatorship is not participation—it is not even historical witnessing.

Due to long-term processes of alienation and consumerism, as well as deliberate attempts to manipulate the public sphere, a lot of people who care don’t actually engage with anyone else. Knowing what you think about the issues is not the same as actually building a democracy.

Even if everyone involved rejects bigotry and scapegoating, the political process is messy and requires negotiating conflicting desires. We need more than to touch grass; we need to dig dirt and plant seeds."

— Andrea Pitzer, Standing on the tracks waiting for a train, January 15, 2025

Be brave

Trust the light and the voice within, Rabbi Danya Ruttenberg tells us. Follow your inner guidance even if it means deviating from your plan. Find your place in the work, and be accountable when you cause harm. "May you grow into your greatest, bravest, most loving self." I'll try to do this, and I pass on her words to you.

old painting of two white people

Saturday, December 2, 2023

Unexpected, unrepeatable, embraceable: 'Fluke' by Brian Klaas

Who we are and what happens: these are inextricably linked. If we care about an event, it's because it happened to someone, and that someone — we tend to believe — must have played a role in it. This is how we form narratives, including the narrative of our own agency.

Fluke: Chance, Chaos, and Why Everything We Do Matters is about this.

detail from the book cover of Fluke, with an arrow deviating from a U-shaped path

The author is Brian Klaas, a professor of global politics at University College London.

(I received an advance review copy from NetGalley. Fluke will be published by Scribner in January.)


Anything can change the course of our lives. A cloud moves, and a plane doesn’t take off or changes its flight path. It matters who is or isn’t on the plane, whether the plane crashes, or where the airmen drop the bomb.

We know that chance occurrences make a difference in the outcome, yet we resist this notion, partly because it seems unfair. Some people live, others die, due to luck? We might as well say they were saved or destroyed for no reason at all.

And "no reason" isn't what we mean when we say we want "the real story" of "what happened." With no meaningful connections between who we are and what happens, we can't track a narrative. “We want a rational explanation to make sense of the chaos of life,” Klaas says.

forest in fog, seen from above
Image: Pixabay

But these little reasons indeed seem to be the real reasons.

“Nobody tiptoes around with extreme care to make sure not to squish the wrong bug. Few panic about an irrevocably changed future after missing the bus,” Klaas observes. Yet how else, he asks, does the future get made?

If your parents hadn’t met, you wouldn’t be here. The same is true for your ancestors.

"We are the offshoots of a sometimes wonderful, sometimes deeply flawed past," and "our existence is bewilderingly fragile, built upon the shakiest of foundations." An asteroid killed the dinosaurs, which allowed all of us to be born millions of years later, and today you’ve subtly altered the future of humanity based on "whether you stopped to have coffee before you rushed out the door."

Yes, our actions are part of a chain of events. Turtles all the way down.

Could we have acted differently, though? Did we have free will then? Do we have free will, right now, to change anything at all?

When we look for a cause, we often see a fluke. The fluke isn’t nothing. It’s just not the meaning we originally hoped for. It’s something unexpected and unrepeatable, and we can embrace it.

Fluke is elegantly readable nonfiction, revolving thorny philosophical questions with ease. It poses the question: What theory makes the most sense to you?

You get to choose what you believe.

Or do you?

For more, see "Why Are We Here? Chaos Brought Us Together" (9 min read), which Books Are Our Superpower published today.


A couple years ago, I wrote about another book by Prof. Klaas: Corruptible: Who Gets Power and How It Changes Us. The article is "Why are powerful people so terrible?" (4 min read).


Saturday, October 1, 2022

Even with limited options, nevertheless, we can change

detail from the book cover of NEVER SAY YOU CAN'T SURVIVE

Charlie Jane Anders’ writing craft book Never Say You Can’t Survive isn’t a philosophy book, except that, well, take a look at this. Here, she talks about how characters can change. As writers and readers, we view their fictional world from the outside, and we also see that they have free will. Maybe we see things about the characters that they aren’t aware of about themselves. When the character has fewer options, they — and we — might perceive their situation as worsening. Still, despite their limited options, the character can change. Almost always, a breakthough is possible.

Here are three brief passages from the book:

Fiction can work all kinds of magic during horrendous times: inspire us to resist evil, expose the reality of the world, create empathy, and help us to understand complex systems from a vantage point that could be hard to reach in nonfiction. But the most powerful thing that fiction can do is show that people can change, and that we all have the potential to be different. That’s where I get a lot of my hope when everything around me feels hopeless.

* * *

Almost every story is some mix of character stuff and plot stuff, and the mix can vary from page to page and chapter to chapter. Character is action: people aren’t just a collection of feeling and opinions and habits, but rather the sum total of all the choices they take. Meanwhile, even the plottiest plotfest needs to have characters who we root for, or else none of the secret codes and countdowns will matter worth a damn.

* * *

I increasingly find it helpful to think in terms of ‘options become constrained,’ rather than ‘things get worse.’ It’s not so much that the situation deteriorates — it’s more like doors are slamming shut, and the protagonists have fewer and fewer courses of action open to them.

— Charlie Jane Anders, Never Say You Can't Survive: How to Get Through Hard Times by Making Up Stories, Tordotcom (2021), Chapters 8, 9, 10

I appreciate philosophy wherever and in whatever format it appears.

book cover of NEVER SAY YOU CAN'T SURVIVE

Previously published July 8, 2022 to the Episyllogism blog. That blog is offline, so now this article is here.

I'd like to add this sentence from Benjamin Harnett's novel The Happy Valley (Serpent Key Press, 2022): "He then had what I'd call an accidental recovery — some people do everything right and still tumble into the abyss, others tumble into the abyss and then one day you find they have stepped up out of it, on the far side, wholly sound."

See also Philip Kinsher's 12 Character Archetypes to Know Before You Start Writing, BookBaby, July 11, 2023. These roles are:

  • The hero
  • The villain
  • The mentor
  • The trickster
  • The guardian
  • The herald
  • The shape-shifter
  • The sidekick
  • The love interest
  • The underdog
  • The femme fatale
  • The jester

Thursday, December 25, 2014

Two critiques of Sam Harris's 'Free Will'

Sam Harris's book Free Will is a brief synopsis of the question of whether humans have free will. We feel that we are making decisions, but we also know that we are at least partly determined by natural causes. On a pool table full of billiard balls hitting other billiard balls, the path of each ball is predetermined, and no ball moves of its own free will. We do not like to think of ourselves in that way, yet this is the implication of saying that all action is initiated by the physical brain, which is itself acted upon by other physical influences. Harris leans toward the side of saying there is no free will.

Sam Harris's book will not be summarized here. Instead, we will look at two critiques.

Less persuasive to me

Free Will: Sam Harris Has It (Wrong) by Barry L. Linetsky (2013)

Linetsky says that "modern philosophy" is "dangerous" to its "victim[s]," as those philosophers who "reject reality" may cause "detachment" and "confusion." (Why specifically modern philosophy, I cannot say.)

Linetsky champions free will by saying, "we know it to be obvious by means of introspection," and that to deny it is "ludicrous and beyond rational comprehension." Everything from a small act of paying attention to being able to take personal responsibility for one's actions requires free will. He points out that Harris accepts the existence of the universe and human consciousness by saying that they are obvious to us. So why, he asks rhetorically, doesn't Harris accept the existence of free will on the same basis? He also suggests that if there is no free will, then people have no control over anything they think; this, for some reason, means they cannot have certainty about any of their conclusions, and that Harris's argument is therefore "invalid."

My problem here: Just because we assume the existence of some things (at least provisionally) does not mean we should decisively and permanently accept the existence of everything. Also, to the extent that certainty is a feeling that arises when we are confronted by evidence or logic that seems persuasive to us, there is no reason that the lack of free will should deprive us of this feeling. It is simply that our feeling of certainty would be determined, along with the thoughts and experiences that bring it about. Furthermore, in either a determined or a free universe, whether Harris feels certain about his own conclusion has nothing to do with whether his argument is logically valid.

Linetsky goes on to say that if our careful deliberation about our many choices – significant and insignificant – is just an illusion, because the outcome of our thought process is already determined, and we are "self-deluded about all of these things all of the time," then we can have no true learning, knowledge, or understanding. The deterministic view must be rejected on the basis, it seems, that this idea is unpleasant.

Pleasant or no, that has nothing to do with whether it is true. Maybe abandoning belief in our own free will does not reveal learning, knowledge, and understanding to be impossible, but rather provides an opportunity for us to redefine what they are. Today there is much investigation into "artificial intelligence." If it is possible (at least in theory) to program a robot to learn, know, and understand, perhaps our own thought and experience is rightly understood along the same lines. This may seem terrible, but it is only redefining and reinterpreting the meaning of human intelligence. What we originally thought about our own intelligence might turn out to have been an illusion. This does not mean that there is no such thing as intelligence.

Linetsky does bring some important insights to the debate. He says it prejudices the investigation to emphasize neuroscientific observation of physical brain activity and to de-emphasize behavioral observations of decision-making in real-life contexts. Moreover, just because the origins of thought are dark and mysterious and that the chain of events stretches back indefinitely far into the past does not enable us to assume that the germ of "free will" can never be found. Linetsky comes down too strong on these points, however. He says that a person's behavior is itself "sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of free will." (It is not; the explanation of the person's behavior is the very question at issue.) He also tries to dodge the question of the infinite regress of causes by saying that "free will" is contained in the moment of decision and that the unmanageably long list of causes predating that moment can be waved away. (They cannot; the question of whether the moment of decision is truly "free" hangs on whether it was controlled by other influences.)

More persuasive to me

Free Will: A Response to Sam Harris by Kurt Keefner (2012)

Keefner observes that Harris divides the human mind into neurological consciousness and neurological unconsciousness. Harris claims that we identify our sense of self with our consciousness, as opposed to our unconsciousness. In focusing on the brain, as Keefner critiques him, Harris seems to entirely neglect the role of the rest of the body. More pointedly, Harris seems to take a purist view that consciousness can be separated from unconsciousness, when there is no such firm dividing line.

Keefner writes: "The quality of consciousness as such does not exist by itself any more than the roundness of a ball exists apart from the ball....to try to understand the roundness of a ball apart from what the ball is made of, its weight, its rigidity or bounciness, etc., would be a serious error."

Consciousness is thus a way we describe something else that is real, but it does not have reality by itself. Consciousness should not be reified – it should not be understood to have more reality than it does. Consciousness is not a "freestanding entity," but the "activity of an integrated entity."

Keefner describes four "levels of functioning": "non-conscious" (e.g. physical vital signs and perception), "unconscious" (e.g. "knowing how to speak our own language"), "preconscious" (e.g. "remembering my sister's name when I'm not thinking about her"), and "conscious" (e.g. "thinking about free will"). These levels of functioning form a "nested hierarchy," such that, when one acts consciously, one also acts preconsciously, unconsciously, and non-consciously. "Physiologically we have to talk about separate processes, but philosophically, the right approach is to own the whole package and feel yourself permeate all of your processes rather than dividing the self up."

He pinpoints a problematic passage in Harris’s book: "Consider what it would take to actually have free will. You would need to be aware of all the factors that determine your thoughts and actions, and you would need to have complete control over those factors." He rebuts this definition of a free being as one with “no unconscious processes at all within it, a completely pure consciousness all the way down.”

He says:

This is a terrible straw man. There is no reason why unconscious forces could not shape part of our mental lives while we consciously exercise some kind of decisive control...True, there are unconscious processes within us, but they are us. The atoms or neurons we are made of don’t cause us to be conscious. Our atoms and neurons are conscious. Our atoms and neurons make choices. It’s not that individual atoms and neurons are conscious and make choices, but in the right organization, i.e. me, they become a whole that is conscious and does make choices.

He concludes that Harris's "philosophical case collapses" because there is no clean divide between unconscious and conscious processes and therefore the conscious ones cannot be purely controlled by the unconscious ones. He also provides a compelling critique of the particular neurological experiments that Harris chose as examples, explaining why they do not demonstrate what Harris says they demonstrate.

Free Will by Sam Harris

Free Will: Sam Harris Has It (Wrong) by Barry Linetsky

Free Will: A Response to Sam Harris by Kurt Keefner

Image: Taken in Zaragoza, España, 2012 and uploaded by 'Juanedc' to Wikimedia Commons. Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license.


The Illusion of Conscious Will
By Daniel M. Wegner
The MIT Press
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/3650.001.0001
ISBN electronic: 9780262285896
In Special Collection: CogNet
Publication date: 2002


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